⚠️ MEDIUMthreat

Aurologic Malicious Hosting - Nexus for High-Risk Infrastructure

German hosting provider aurologic GmbH, operating from Tornado Datacenter in Langen, has emerged as a critical upstream infrastructure provider for multiple malicious hosting networks. Approximately 50% of sanctioned Aeza Group's announced IP prefixes route through aurologic despite international sanctions from the United States and United Kingdom. The company provides connectivity to several hosting providers assessed as threat activity enablers, including metaspinner net, Femo IT Solutions, Global-Data System IT, and Railnet LLC. These downstream customers consistently rank among top sources of validated malicious infrastructure, hosting command-and-control servers for Cobalt Strike, Amadey, QuasarRAT, Rhadamanthys, and RedLine Stealer.

🎯CORTEX Protocol Intelligence Assessment

Business Impact: Aurologic malicious hosting relationships highlight systemic risk in internet infrastructure, where upstream carriers quietly sustain botnets, C2 fleets, and sanctioned services that threaten enterprises worldwide. Organizations relying on IP-reputation or geo-blocking alone may underestimate exposure when traffic is funneled through ostensibly legitimate European carriers with high concentrations of abuse. Technical Context: Aurologic malicious hosting is characterized by dense connectivity to threat activity enablers, high volumes of validated C2 endpoints, and routing patterns that tie sanctioned entities like Aeza Group to global connectivity despite enforcement actions. Recorded Future telemetry and independent research connect aurologic to infrastructures used for malware C2, information-stealer distribution, and Russia-linked disinformation networks. The case underlines the need for defenders to track AS-level relationships and upstream providers, not just individual IPs or domains.

Strategic Intelligence Guidance

  • Incorporate autonomous system (AS) reputation and upstream-provider context into network defenses, treating aurologic and similar ASNs as high-risk where business justified.
  • Work with threat-intelligence providers to maintain updated blocklists and risk scores for IP ranges associated with aurologic’s high-abuse customers and their successors.
  • Use flow data and proxy logs to identify unexpected dependencies on high-risk upstream networks, and design alternative connectivity paths where feasible.
  • Engage with ISPs, regulators, and industry groups to promote accountability for upstream providers that repeatedly appear in malware, C2, and disinformation investigations.

Vendors

aurologic GmbHTornado DatacenterAeza Group

Threats

Malicious hosting infrastructureCommand-and-control hosting

Targets

Malware operatorsSanctioned entitiesUpstream providers