Three former incident response professionals—Kevin Tyler Martin, Ryan Clifford Goldberg, and an unnamed co-conspirator—face federal charges for allegedly deploying ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware against five companies between May and November 2023. The targets included a medical device company, pharmaceutical firm, doctor's office, engineering company, and drone manufacturer. They demanded $10 million from the medical device maker, ultimately receiving around $1.27 million—their only successful attack. Other ransom demands ranged from $300,000 to $5 million. What's wild: the defendants' prior roles at DigitalMint and Sygnia Cybersecurity Services gave them deep knowledge of incident response processes and cryptocurrency-based ransom workflows. An FBI affidavit shows Goldberg told agents he took part in the scheme to try to get out of debt. Recent research from Cybersecurity Insiders and Cogility found that 93% of security leaders view insider threats as harder to detect than external cyberattacks, with only 23% expressing strong confidence in stopping them before serious damage occurs. Only 12% reported having mature predictive risk models. The case challenges traditional insider threat models that focus on employees attacking their own employer. Here, the allegation is that skilled professionals used their expertise to target external organizations, exploiting trust in their professional roles during and after employment. Commentary from industry leaders notes that even cybersecurity vendors themselves can become sources of risk if oversight, behavioral monitoring, and support structures for stressed staff are insufficient.
🎯CORTEX Protocol Intelligence Assessment
Business Impact: Rogue ransomware negotiator behavior shows that high-trust security roles can morph into external threat actors capable of orchestrating multimillion-dollar extortion campaigns. Organizations that assume vendor staff and incident response partners are inherently safe may underestimate the risk posed by financially stressed or disgruntled insiders with deep operational knowledge. Technical Context: The alleged use of ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware by former IR professionals illustrates how access to negotiation playbooks, cryptocurrency handling processes, and prior victim telemetry can be repurposed for offensive operations. Traditional perimeter-focused controls provide limited protection when the adversary understands response tooling and expected defensive playbooks from prior legitimate work.
⚡Strategic Intelligence Guidance
- Enhance insider risk programs to explicitly cover third-party security vendors and contractors, including background checks, ongoing monitoring, and clear escalation paths for behavioral and financial red flags.
- Implement strict segregation of duties and just-in-time access for ransomware negotiation platforms, decryption tools, and cryptocurrency wallets used in incident response.
- Formalize contracts and audit rights with incident response partners to ensure they maintain insider threat programs, mental health support, and governance for staff in high-stress roles.
- Regularly brief executive leadership and boards on insider risk trends, using real-world cases like the rogue ransomware negotiator allegations to drive investment in people-focused security controls.
Vendors
DigitalMintSygnia Cybersecurity Services
Threats
Rogue ransomware negotiatorALPHVBlackCatInsider threat
Targets
Medical device companyPharmaceutical companyDoctor’s officeEngineering companyDrone manufacturer
Impact
Financial:$1.27M paid ransom; demands up to $10M